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DEPARTING FROM SEMINOLE ROCK 
DEFERENCE: IN DECKER, A SHIFT IN TIDE 
Benjamin Clements 
In Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center,1 the 
Supreme Court upheld a deferential standard of review first 
announced in 1945.2 Under the standard, courts defer to an 
administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation unless “it 
is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”3 
The Decker Court aptly recognized that the standard “go[es] to 
the heart of administrative law” and “arise[s] as a matter of course on 
a regular basis.”4 But in addition, the Court for the first time raised 
serious questions about the standard’s propriety.5 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Decker litigation began after logging and paper-products 
companies (the “logging companies”) contracted with the state of 
Oregon to harvest timber.6 The logging companies used two roads 
for that purpose.7 Rainfall caused water to run off the roads, 
displacing dirt and crushed gravel into nearby rivers and streams, 
endangering fish and other aquatic life.8 
The Northwest Environmental Defense Center (NEDC) filed 
suit, asserting that the logging companies discharged stormwater into 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Economics, French, 
Bucknell University, May 2010. I am extremely grateful to Professor Daniel P. Selmi for his 
insight, guidance, and encouragement throughout the writing process. Thank you also to the staff 
and editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their commitment to the editorial 
process and discerning feedback. Finally, thank you to my parents and sister, who always have 
supported me in my endeavors.  
 1. 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013). 
 2. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
 3. Id. at 414. 
 4. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1338–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 5. Id. at 1339–44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 6. Id. at 1333 (majority opinion). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
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two Oregon rivers without obtaining the permits required by the 
Clean Water Act.9 The district court dismissed the action, ruling that 
the Act did not require permits for the runoff.10 The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that permits were 
required.11 
The Supreme Court reversed.12 A seven-justice majority upheld 
the standard by deferring to the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA) interpretation of its own regulation.13 In a brief concurring 
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that the Court had 
“some interest” in reconsidering the standard, but decided that 
Decker was not the case to reexamine the standard’s propriety.14 
Justice Scalia, in an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
disagreed.15 It is his dissent that makes Decker a potentially 
significant development in administrative law, essentially inviting 
practitioners to preserve the issue for appeal and raise it for review 
by the Court.16 
This Comment posits that Decker’s legacy will be to change the 
standard, known as Seminole Rock deference. For sixty-eight years, 
the standard has been a hallmark of administrative law. It has 
enjoyed a relatively unblemished existence. But Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in Decker gives voice to the criticisms of the standard on a 
new and elevated platform, and it consolidates them into a 
succinct—if one-sided—argument. 
In particular, the principle of separation of powers undermines 
Seminole Rock deference.17 The proposition that the same entity 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 1333–34. 
 12. Id. at 1338. 
 13. Justice Breyer did not participate. Id. 
 14. Id. at 1339 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 15. Id. at 1339–44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 16.  See Quin M. Sorenson, Decker v. NEDC: A New Dispute over Judicial Deference to an 
Agency’s Interpretation of Its Own Regulation, 44 No. 6 ABA TRENDS 9, 12 (July/August 2013) 
(“[C]ounsel in any administrative law case . . . in which the Auer doctrine may play a role would 
be well-advised to preserve and press that challenge throughout the proceedings, to ensure that 
their case, if it reaches the Court, qualifies as one in which . . . ‘the issue is properly raised and 
argued.’”).  
 17. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 631 (1996) (“By permitting agencies 
both to write regulations and to construe them authoritatively, Seminole Rock effectively unifies 
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should not make law and enforce it favors a lower standard of 
deference than that currently afforded. The principle also 
distinguishes Seminole Rock deference from a similar deferential 
standard announced more recently in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,18 which requires courts to 
defer to an agency’s “permissible” construction of a statute it 
administers if the statute is “silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue” under review.19 
This distinction is important because much of the discussion 
surrounding Seminole Rock’s propriety stems from that surrounding 
Chevron.20 Consequently, any reason for departing from Seminole 
Rock deference would ideally explain why courts should treat agency 
interpretations of agency rules differently from agency 
interpretations of statutes. In that respect, the separation of powers 
concern fits the bill.21 
The Comment proceeds as follows: Part II presents the history 
of the deferential standard, discussing relevant case law and the 
Administrative Procedure Act. Part III examines the Decker Court’s 
analysis, progressing from the majority opinion to Justice Scalia’s 
concurring and dissenting opinion. Part IV then offers thoughts about 
the case’s impact on the future of the standard, arguing that the 
separation of powers demands a lower degree of judicial deference 
for agency interpretations of regulations. Finally, Part V concludes. 
II.  HISTORY 
A.  Seminole Rock 
The deferential standard of review originated in the 1945 case of 
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.22 In April 1942, to stymie 
wartime inflation, the administrator of the Office of Price 
 
lawmaking and law-exposition—a combination of powers decisively rejected by our 
constitutional structure.”). 
 18. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 19. Id. at 843. 
 20. See Manning, supra note 17, at 627 (“Seminole Rock adopts an approach to agency 
interpretations of regulations that . . . is quite similar to Chevron’s framework for statutes.”). 
 21. Id. at 639 (“[W]hereas Chevron retains one independent interpretive check on 
lawmaking by Congress, Seminole Rock leaves in place no independent interpretive check on 
lawmaking by an administrative agency.”). 
 22. 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
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Administration issued regulations controlling the prices of goods and 
services in the national economy.23 The regulatory scheme required 
sellers to charge no more for their goods and services than the prices 
they had charged during the month of March 1942 (the “price freeze 
requirement”).24 A dispute arose over the Administrator’s 
interpretation of the price freeze requirement.25 
In October 1941 the Seminole Rock & Sand Company, a 
manufacturer of crushed stone, contracted to sell crushed stone to a 
railroad company at a price of sixty cents per ton.26 Then, in January 
1942 it contracted to sell crushed stone to a construction company 
for $1.50 per ton.27 It delivered the stone from the first sale in March 
1942 and the stone from the second sale in January and August 
1942.28 When Seminole Rock then made new contracts with the 
railroad company at both prices of eighty-five cents and $1.00 per 
ton, the administrator filed suit, asserting that the price freeze 
requirement set Seminole Rock’s maximum price for crushed stone 
at sixty cents per ton.29 
This conclusion turned on the administrator’s interpretation of 
the regulatory phrase “[h]ighest price charged during March, 
1942.”30 In his opinion, because Seminole Rock had delivered 
crushed stone to the railroad in March 1942, the regulation precluded 
it from charging more than the price charged for that delivery: sixty 
cents per ton.31 
Seminole Rock disagreed, asserting that the administrator’s 
interpretation of the price freeze requirement attached to a sale only 
if both the charge and the delivery occurred during March 1942. 
Since it had entered its contract with the construction company prior 
to March but not yet delivered all of the ordered stone, Seminole 
 
 23. Id. at 413. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 413–15. 
 26. Id. at 412. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 414; see also id. at 415 (“The dispute in this instance centers about the meaning 
and applicability of rule (i).”). 
 31. Id. at 415. 
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Rock argued that its highest offering price as of that month—$1.50 
per ton—should determine the new maximum.32 
The Court reasoned that it “must necessarily look to the 
administrative construction of the regulation” to resolve any textual 
ambiguity.33 It continued: “[T]he ultimate criterion is the 
administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight 
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. . . . 
Our only tools, therefore, are the plain words of the regulation and 
any relevant interpretations of the [administrative agency].”34 
Applying these “tools,” the Court first examined the regulation’s 
language, concluding that the price freeze requirement turned on 
whether goods were actually delivered during the month of March 
1942.35 To bolster that conclusion, the Court pointed to evidence of 
the administrator’s interpretation—that “delivery during March, 
rather than the making of a sale during March, is controlling.”36 
The Seminole Rock Court provided no justification or citation to 
authority for the standard it articulated.37 Over the years, however, 
academics and courts have fleshed out the rationales ostensibly 
underlying Seminole Rock deference.38 Today, the standard is a 
centerpiece of administrative law.39 
B.  The Administrative Procedure Act 
Shortly after the Court decided Seminole Rock, Congress 
enacted the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA).40 The 
purpose of the APA was to create a check on the power of 
administrative agencies, by protecting private rights from 
administrative “excesses.”41 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 413–14. 
 34. Id. at 414. 
 35. Id. at 415–17. 
 36. Id. at 417 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1454 (2011). 
 38. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 39. See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1339 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 40. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596, 701–706 (2006). 
 41. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950); see also Robert A. Anthony, 
The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1,  
9–10 (1996) (stating that the APA intended to “arm affected persons with recourse to an 
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The APA set in place two means of accomplishing that task. 
First, it established procedural requirements that must be met before 
agency rules have the force of law. Second, it provided for judicial 
review of agency actions.42 
1.  Procedural Safeguards for Legislative Rules 
To promulgate rules that have the force of law, agencies must 
abide by certain procedural safeguards that act as a check on 
administrative actions.43 The most prominent of these are notice-and-
comment requirements, under which agencies must provide the 
public with notice of proposed rules and the opportunity to 
respond.44 
Section 553 outlines these requirements.45 The agency’s notice 
must state the time and place of the rulemaking proceedings, the 
legal basis authorizing the proposed rule, and a description of the 
underlying issues, if not the terms of the rule.46 The agency must 
then allow the public to participate in the proceedings.47 
Exempted from section 553’s notice-and-comment requirements 
are “interpretative,”48 often referred to as “interpretive,” rules.49 
These rules do not have the force of law but are instead issued “to 
advise the public” of how the agency interprets the statutes and rules 
it administers.50 
 
independent judicial interpreter of the agency’s legislative act, where, after all, the agency is often 
an adverse party”). 
 42. Stephenson and Pogoriler refer to this dichotomy as the “‘pay me now or pay me later’ 
principle.” Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 37, at 1464. 
 43. See Anthony, supra note 41, at 3; Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, 
“Legislative” Rules and “Spurious” Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 1, 3–4 
(1994). 
 44. See Anthony, supra note 41, at 3; Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, 
“Legislative” Rules and “Spurious” Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 1, 3–4 
(1994). 
 45. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
 46. Id. § 553(b)(1)–(3). 
 47. Id. § 553(c). 
 48. Id. § 553(b)(A). 
 49. Anthony, supra note 43, at 1–2; Anthony, supra note 41, at 8 n.16. 
 50. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947). 
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Though the APA explicitly distinguishes between legislative and 
interpretive rules, Seminole Rock deference does not.51 A common 
criticism of the standard, therefore, is that it applies regardless of 
whether the agency interpretation is of a legislative rule promulgated 
pursuant to the APA’s procedures—and thus subject to notice and 
comment by the public—or an interpretive rule exempted from those 
procedures.52 
2.  Judicial Review 
Section 706 addresses the judiciary’s role in reviewing agency 
decisions.53 It provides that “the reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law . . . and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action.”54 The latter term—
“agency action”—specifically encompasses “the whole or a part of 
an agency rule.”55 
Congress thus exercised its constitutional authority to expressly 
define the relationship between the judiciary and administrative 
agencies. It chose to delegate to the courts the power to determine 
the meaning or applicability of agency rules. Another common 
criticism of Seminole Rock deference, therefore, is its apparent 
defiance of Congress’s prerogative.56 Similarly, the deferential 
standard seems to contravene Marbury v. Madison,57 which 
unequivocally pronounced the judicial role: “to say what the law 
is.”58 
 
 51. See Anthony, supra note 41, at 6 (“The Court appears to be willing to accept any 
‘interpretation’ that is not inconsistent with the regulation . . . regardless of agency failure to 
observe notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.”). 
 52. See id. (“The Court fails to separate the question of the weight to be given the 
interpretation from the question of whether the interpretative document is one that is entitled to 
exemption from APA notice-and-comment requirements.”). 
 53. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 54. Id. (emphasis added). 
 55. Id. § 551(13). 
 56. See Robert A. Anthony & Michael Asimow, The Court’s Deferences—A Foolish 
Inconsistency, 26 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 10, 10–11 (2000) (“The review standard directly 
flouts § 706’s command . . . .”); Anthony, supra note 41, at 6 (“[Seminole Rock deference] 
contravenes the spirit of the APA . . . .”); Manning, supra note 17, at 621 (“[T]he APA . . . 
instructs reviewing courts” to interpret regulations.). 
 57. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 58. Id. at 177; see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1340 (2013)  
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that the agency’s role is to 
formulate the rules, and the court’s role “is to determine the fair meaning of the rule”); Manning, 
supra note 17, at 621; Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 37, at 1457. 
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And yet the Court rarely addresses the APA when it should.59 
Consistently, the Court fails to mention section 706 when applying 
Seminole Rock deference.60 As a consequence, the degree of 
deference afforded by Seminole Rock encourages agencies “to issue 
vague regulations, and then to make the operative law through 
‘interpretations’ of those regulations.”61 This unchecked authority 
was precisely the worry underlying Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Decker,62 and one that implicates the separation of powers, a concern 
going to the core of our nation’s constitutional structure.63 
C.  Rationales 
Chief among the rationales offered to justify Seminole Rock 
deference is the theory of implied delegation. The theory posits that 
Congress, by expressly delegating rulemaking authority to agencies, 
impliedly delegates the authority to say what those rules mean.64 
Whether or not courts explicitly refer to this rationale,65 courts 
employ this legal fiction to justify deferring to agencies’ expertise, 
which makes sense due to the technical nature of many regulatory 
 
 59. Anthony, supra note 41, at 2. 
 60. Id. at 5 n.10. 
 61. Id. at 6; see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 463 (1997) (“A rule requiring the 
Secretary [of Labor] to construe his own regulations narrowly would make little sense, since he is 
free to write the regulations as broadly as he wishes, subject only to the limits imposed by the 
statute.”); Manning, supra note 17, at 655 (“The right of self-interpretation under Seminole Rock 
removes an important affirmative reason for the agency to express itself clearly; since the agency 
can say what its own regulations mean (unless the agency’s view is plainly erroneous), the agency 
bears little, if any, risk of its own opacity or imprecision.”). 
 62. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(explaining that when an agency interprets its own rules, “[t]he power to prescribe is augmented 
by the power to interpret; and the incentive is to speak vaguely and broadly, so as to retain a 
‘flexibility’ that will enable ‘clarification’ with retroactive effect”). 
 63. Id.; see also Manning, supra note 17, at 654 (asserting that Seminole Rock deference 
“contradicts the constitutional premise that lawmaking and law-exposition must be distinct”). 
 64. See Manning, supra note 17, at 627, 654; Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 37, at 
1457. 
 65. E.g., Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 
(1991). 
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schemes.66 It also excuses unelected judges from making potentially 
political decisions better left to another branch of government.67 
The theory of implied delegation appears to have largely 
replaced the “originalist” explanation for the doctrine.68 The 
originalist theory rationalizes Seminole Rock deference on the ground 
that the agency interpreting the regulation under review also issued 
the regulation and understands it better than courts, particularly 
where the subject matter is technical.69 This explanation, however, 
ignores the reality that courts determine a regulation’s meaning 
primarily by looking at its plain language, not the intent of the 
issuing agency.70 It also raises new questions without answering 
them, such as whether deference should be due when a significant 
amount of time has passed since the regulation’s promulgation, or 
when an agency has inconsistently interpreted a regulation over 
time.71 
D.  Auer 
These rationales were much more fully developed by 1997, 
when the Court decided Auer v. Robbins.72 In Auer, a unanimous 
Court upheld the secretary of labor’s interpretation of a regulation 
promulgated under authority delegated by the Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938 (FLSA).73 
In 1988, St. Louis police sergeants and a lieutenant filed suit 
against members of the board of police commissioners seeking 
overtime pay under section 7(a)(1) of the FLSA (the “overtime pay 
requirement”).74 The FLSA, however, exempts from the overtime 
 
 66. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 37, at 1456–57, 1459; see also Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 
1340 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“To give an agency less control over 
the meaning of its own regulations than it has over the meaning of a congressionally enacted 
statute seems quite odd.”); Manning, supra note 17, at 629–30 (explaining that the agency’s 
expertise justifies deference to agency interpretations of regulations). 
 67. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 37, at 1456–57, 1459–60; accord Manning, supra 
note 17, at 630. 
 68. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 37, at 1457; Manning, supra note 17, at 630–31. 
 69. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1340 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Manning, supra note 17, at 631; Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 37, at 1454. 
 70. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1340 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 71. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 37, at 1455. 
 72. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 73. Id. at 453, 461–62. 
 74. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1994); Auer, 519 U.S. at 455. 
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pay requirement those “employed in a bona fide executive, 
administrative, or professional capacity.”75 To clarify when an 
employee falls within the exemption, the secretary issued regulations 
extending the exemption only to employees earning a salary.76 The 
regulations defined “salary” as a predetermined amount of money 
not “subject to reduction” based on the quality or quantity of the 
employee’s work.77 
The parties disputed whether the sergeants’ and lieutenant’s pay 
was “subject to” reduction within the meaning of the regulations.78 
The sergeants and lieutenant asserted that they were not salaried 
employees because the department’s policy theoretically provided 
for disciplinary deductions in pay.79 The secretary, however, read the 
regulation to require more than a theoretical possibility of reductions 
in pay.80 Under his reading, the regulation required either “an actual 
practice of making such deductions” or “a ‘significant likelihood’ of 
such deductions.”81 His interpretation accounted for the reality that to 
find otherwise would potentially subject employers with vague 
disciplinary policies to substantial overtime pay liability.82 
The Court, citing Seminole Rock, deferred to the secretary’s 
interpretation.83 It confined its review of that interpretation to two 
dictionary definitions of the “critical phrase”: “subject to.”84 It then 
concluded that the phrase “comfortably bears the meaning the 
Secretary assigns,”85 and it denied the sergeants and lieutenant 
relief.86 
E.  Chevron 
For good reason, much of the recent scholarship focusing on 
Seminole Rock deference incorporates the deferential standard 
 
 75. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1994); Auer, 519 U.S. at 455. 
 76. Auer, 519 U.S. at 455; see 29 C.F.R. § 541.2(e) (1996). 
 77. 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (1996); Auer, 519 U.S. at 455. 
 78. Auer, 519 U.S. at 459. 
 79. Id. at 455, 459–60. 
 80. Id. at 461. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 464. 
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announced in Chevron.87 Chevron requires courts to defer to an 
agency’s “permissible” construction of a statute if the statute is 
“silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” under 
review.88 Deference is due whether Congress expressly or impliedly 
leaves statutory ambiguities for the administrative agency to 
resolve.89 
The Court has made clear that the theory of implied delegation 
supports Chevron deference.90 That theory seeks to identify 
congressional intent by asking, What governmental body did 
Congress want to resolve the ambiguities it left in its statutory 
language? According to the theory, Congress prefers administrative 
agencies to courts.91 In other words, the theory is just as much about 
judicial self-restraint and adhering to the Constitution’s separation of 
powers mandate as it is about recognizing the expertise of agencies.92 
Increasingly, however, the Court has backed away from the 
blanket rule of Chevron, favoring instead a more nuanced 
approach.93 In 2000, for example, the Court held that a statutory 
interpretation issued in an informal opinion letter “do[es] not warrant 
Chevron-style deference.”94 In 2001, the Court affirmed that 
principle, holding that statutory constructions issued by agencies, 
without procedural safeguards, should not necessarily be afforded 
Chevron deference.95 
Decker indicates that a similar retreat from the blanket deference 
afforded by Seminole Rock may be on the horizon. A retreat would 
be appropriate because of the principle of separation of powers. For 
although the theory of implied delegation does not violate that 
principle when an administrative agency interprets a statute, the same 
cannot be said when the agency interprets a regulation—a creature of 
 
 87. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 88. Id. at 843. 
 89. Id. at 843–44. 
 90. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996); Manning, supra note 
17, at 630–31. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Manning, supra note 17, at 629 (explaining that courts interpreting statutes and 
regulations must be “sensitiv[e] to the proper roles of the political and judicial branches in our 
system of government” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 93. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 37, at 1450–51. 
 94. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
 95. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235–38 (2001). 
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its own making. Tempering Seminole Rock, therefore, is, at least in 
one respect, more easily justified than tempering Chevron.96 
III.  ANALYSIS 
During the March 2013 Term, the Decker Court upheld 
Seminole Rock deference by affirming the EPA’s interpretation of a 
regulation promulgated under authority delegated by the Clean Water 
Act.97 But three of the Court’s members seemed to signal a growing 
distaste for the standard.98 
Before addressing Decker’s three opinions, this Comment will 
discuss three matters to set the stage: first, the provisions and 
implementing regulations of the Clean Water Act necessary to 
explain the dispute; second, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling; and third, the 
EPA’s interpretation of its own regulation. 
A.  The Clean Water Act and Its Implementing Regulations 
The Clean Water Act of 197299 (the “Act”) implemented a 
permitting scheme to protect the nation’s waters from pollution.100 
Under the Act, pollution from any “point source” requires a National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, unless the 
particular discharge is exempted.101 A “point source” is any 
“conveyance”—such as a pipe, ditch, or tunnel—“from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged.”102 
Congress has exempted most discharges “composed entirely of 
stormwater.”103 There is, however, an exception to that exemption: 
stormwater discharges “associated with industrial activity” continue 
to require permits.104 The question in Decker was whether particular 
stormwater discharges were “associated with industrial activity” as 
the EPA defined the term.105 
 
 96. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 97. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1329–30 (2013). 
 98. Id. at 1338–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1339–44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 99. 86 Stat. 816; 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
 100. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1331. 
 101. Id. 
 102. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994). 
 103. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 104. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 105. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1336. 
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1.  The Silvicultural Rule 
In 1973, the EPA issued regulations exempting some point-
source discharges from the Act’s permit requirements.106 For 
example, it exempted discharges composed entirely of 
uncontaminated stormwater and discharges from silvicultural 
activities107—that is, activities dealing with “the development and 
care of forests.”108 It did so because these discharges accounted for a 
large number of point sources and including them made the 
permitting scheme “unworkable.”109 
The Natural Resources Defense Council filed suit, challenging 
the EPA’s authority to create the exemptions.110 The District Court 
for the District of Columbia held that the Act did not authorize the 
EPA to exempt any type of point-source discharge.111 Congress, it 
reasoned, did not “approve[] exemptions for . . . categories of point 
sources” other than those it itself expressly exempted.112 Thus, in 
1976, while its appeal was pending, the EPA amended the 
regulations to more precisely define the types of discharges that were 
point sources, rather than categorically exempt some point 
sources.113 
One such regulation (the “Silvicultural Rule”) concerned 
discharges from silvicultural activities. Under the Silvicultural Rule, 
only activities discharging pollutants “‘as a result of controlled water 
used by a person’” qualified as point sources.114 Those activities, the 
EPA decided, included only “rock crushing, gravel washing, log 
 
 106. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1393, 1395 (D.D.C. 1975). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Silviculture Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http:// 
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/silviculture (last visited Nov. 9, 2013). 
 109. Train, 396 F. Supp. at 1395. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1398, 1402. 
 112. Id. at 1398. 
 113. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1331 (2013). In 1977, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 114. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1074 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 41 Fed. 
Reg. 6282 (Feb. 12, 1976)). 
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sorting, or log storage facilities.”115 Not included were timber 
“harvesting operations” “from which there is natural runoff.”116 
2.  The Industrial Activity Rule 
In 1987, Congress amended the Act to exempt from the NPDES 
permitting scheme most discharges “composed entirely of 
stormwater” (the “stormwater exemption”).117 It did so to ease the 
EPA’s burden of managing discharges composed only of stormwater 
runoff.118 The burden was tremendous, because the definition of 
“point source” encompassed a broad variety of potential sources of 
stormwater runoff—including schools, churches, and homes—all of 
which would require permits.119 
Congress, however, did not exempt stormwater discharges 
“associated with industrial activity.”120 Thus, even if a particular 
discharge fell within the stormwater exemption, it still required an 
NPDES permit if it was “associated with industrial activity”—a term 
Congress did not define.121 
In 1990, the EPA promulgated regulations for the exempted 
stormwater discharges.122 In 1992, history repeated itself: The Ninth 
Circuit held some of the regulations invalid because the EPA did not 
have authority to exempt discharges coming from concededly 
industrial activity.123 
One 1990 regulation (the “Industrial Activity Rule”) filled the 
void that Congress had left by defining the term “associated with 
industrial activity.”124 For example, stormwater discharges are 
associated with industrial activity if they are “directly related to 
manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage areas at an 
industrial plant.”125 The same is true if stormwater discharges come 
 
 115. 40 C.F.R. § 122.27(b)(1) (2011). The current version of the Silvicultural Rule, quoted 
above, differs only slightly from the amended version issued in 1976. Brown, 640 F.3d at 1077. 
 116. 40 C.F.R. § 122.27(b)(1). 
 117. Decker, 133 S. Ct at 1332 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 118. Id. at 1331–32.  
 119. Brown, 640 F.3d at 1082. 
 120. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B) (1994). 
 121. Decker, 133 S. Ct at 1332 (2013). 
 122. Brown, 640 F.3d at 1083. 
 123. Natural Res. Def. Council v. E.P.A., 966 F.2d 1292, 1306 (9th Cir. 1992); see supra note 
112 and accompanying text. 
 124. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2006). 
 125. Id. 
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from “immediate access roads . . . used or traveled by carriers of raw 
materials” in connection with an “industrial facility” operating in one 
of the predetermined industries.126 “[I]mmediate access roads” are 
“exclusively or primarily dedicated for use by the industrial 
facility.”127 
In addition to defining “associated with industrial activity,” the 
Industrial Activity Rule identifies certain types of business facilities 
across different industries that are “considered to be engaging in 
‘industrial activity.’”128 It does so by referencing the Standard 
Industrial Classifications—a system used by administrative agencies 
to group business firms by industry.129 For example, the regulation 
refers to Standard Industrial Classification 24, which covers the 
“Lumber and Wood Products” industry and includes the logging 
business.130 Logging facilities are “[e]stablishments primarily 
engaged in cutting timber and in producing . . . forest or wood raw 
materials.”131 
The result is that permits are required for silvicultural point 
sources, as defined by the Silvicultural Rule, that are “associated 
with industrial activity,” as defined by the Industrial Activity Rule. 
The substantive question in Decker, therefore, was whether 
stormwater discharges coming from a timber-harvesting operation 
were “associated with industrial activity.”132 If so, then the Act, 
through the Industrial Activity Rule, required the logging companies 
to obtain NPDES permits.133 If not, no permits were required under 
the stormwater exemption.134 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. 55 Fed. Reg. 47990, 48009 (Nov. 16, 1990); see Brown, 640 F.3d at 1084. 
 128. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2006). 
 129. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1332 (2013). 
 130. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 131. Id. at 1332 (quoting Dept. of Labor, Standard Industrial Classifications Manual, 
available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html); see 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) 
(2006). 
 132. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1336. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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B.  The Ninth Circuit’s Ruling 
The logging companies argued that permits were not required.135 
They asserted that the Silvicultural Rule excluded from the definition 
of “point source” the stormwater runoff at issue.136 The Ninth Circuit 
rejected the argument. It concluded that stormwater runoff is 
statutorily not a point source if “allowed to run off naturally,” but 
does constitute such a source if it is controlled in some manner—if, 
for example, it is collected and then discharged.137 
The logging companies also argued that no permits were 
required because of the 1987 stormwater exemption.138 They asserted 
that logging sites were not “associated with industrial activity” 
because they were not “industrial facilities.”139 Despite the Industrial 
Activity Rule’s express incorporation of logging facilities by 
reference to Standard Industrial Classification 24, they maintained 
that logging sites were not “traditional industrial plants,” meaning 
the roads used by them were not “immediate access roads” subject to 
the regulation.140 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, concluding that the discharges 
were unambiguously “associated with industrial activity.”141 The 
court pointed to the many facilities—“including mines, landfills, 
junkyards, and construction sites”—that the rule classified as 
conducting industrial activity, even though they were not traditional 
industrial plants.142 Applying the same reasoning used in 1992 to 
strike down different EPA regulations,143 the court concluded that the 
agency did not have authority to exempt point-source discharges that 
were concededly industrial in nature.144 
 
 135. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 1070–71. 
 138. Id. at 1069. 
 139. Id. at 1084. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1085; see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1333–34 (2013) 
(“[T]he Court of Appeals held that . . . the discharges at issue are ‘associated with industrial 
action’ within the meaning of the regulation . . . .”). 
 142. Brown, 640 F.3d at 1084. 
 143. See supra notes 111, 121 and accompanying text. 
 144. Brown, 640 F.3d at 1085. 
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C.  The EPA’s Interpretation of the Industrial Activity Rule 
The EPA disagreed with the Ninth Circuit, and three days before 
the Supreme Court heard arguments, it amended the Industrial 
Activity Rule.145 The agency submitted to the Decker Court its 
interpretation of the pre-amendment rule in an amicus curiae brief.146 
It concluded that the discharges at issue did not require permits, 
focusing on the regulation’s reference to industrial “facilities,” which 
it reasoned were more “fixed and permanent” than “temporary . . . 
logging installations.”147 
It also concluded that timber-harvesting operations, like the one 
in Oregon, did not “manufacture” or “process” materials and were 
not “raw materials storage areas at an industrial plant.”148 This meant 
stormwater discharges could be “directly related” to the harvesting of 
timber without falling within the scope of the Industrial Activity 
Rule. 
These distinctions, the agency felt, meant the discharges at issue 
were not “associated with industrial activity” and, therefore, did not 
require permits due to the 1987 stormwater exemption.149 It is this 
interpretation to which the Court ultimately deferred.150 
  D.  The Decker Majority  
As a preliminary matter, the Court addressed two jurisdictional 
questions.151 It first ruled that a particular provision of the Act—
which made judicial review the exclusive means of reviewing certain 
agency actions and set a time bar for that review—did not preclude 
NEDC’s suit.152 Second, it ruled that the EPA’s amendment of the 
Industrial Activity Rule did not render the Court’s review of the 
Ninth Circuit ruling moot.153 
The Court then turned to the merits. It first concluded that, as a 
general matter, logging activities are not necessarily “industrial” in 
 
 145. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1332; see 77 Fed. Reg. 72974 (Dec. 7, 2012) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 122, sub pt. B). 
 146. See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1336 (citing “Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae”). 
 147. Id. at 1336–37. 
 148. Id. at 1337. 
 149. Id. at 1337. 
 150. Id. at 1338. 
 151. Id. at 1334–36. 
 152. Id. at 1334–35. 
 153. Id. at 1335–36. 
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nature, since by definition “industrial” activities might be only the 
limited production processes occurring in factories.154 It then more 
specifically considered whether the discharges at issue were 
“associated with industrial activity.”155 
In so doing, the Court rejected the conclusion reached by both 
NEDC and the Ninth Circuit—that the Industrial Activity Rule’s 
incorporation of Standard Industrial Classification 24 meant logging 
facilities were “associated with industrial activity.” Evidently, the 
Court was not convinced that the logging industry as a whole 
qualified as “industrial activity,” even though logging facilities 
did.156 
The majority explained away the examples of nontraditional 
industrial sites the Industrial Activity Rule classified as engaging in 
industrial activity.157 It reasoned that mines, landfills, junkyards, and 
construction sites “tend to be more fixed and permanent than timber-
harvesting operations” and have a “closer connection” to traditional 
industrial sites.158 The regulation’s inclusion of these nontraditional 
sites, it surmised, did not necessarily imply that all stormwater 
discharges from such sites were also included.159 
As a result, the majority deemed the EPA’s interpretation 
“permissible.”160 Focusing on the Industrial Activity Rule’s 
references to “‘facilities,’ ‘establishments,’ ‘manufacturing,’ 
‘processing,’ and an ‘industrial plant,’” the majority found the EPA 
could have reasonably concluded that only “traditional industrial 
buildings such as factories and associated sites, as well as other 
relatively fixed facilities,” fall within the regulation’s scope.161 In 
deferring to that interpretation under Seminole Rock, the Decker 
majority adhered to the well-established principle that “an agency’s 
interpretation need not be the only possible reading of a regulation—
or even the best one—to prevail.”162 
 
 154. Id. at 1336. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 1337. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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E.  The Chief Justice’s Concurrence 
In his brief concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts indicated that he 
might be receptive to reconsidering Seminole Rock deference in 
some fashion.163 Justice Alito joined that sentiment.164 Both felt, 
however, that it was inappropriate to address the issue when each of 
the parties had limited its relevant discussion to a single footnote.165 
The concurrence nevertheless underscored the important role 
Seminole Rock deference plays in the Court’s administrative 
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice characterized the issue as “a basic 
one going to the heart of administrative law,” one that “arise[s] as a 
matter of course on a regular basis.”166 He then openly stated that the 
Court had “some interest in reconsidering” the standard.167 But it was 
Justice Scalia who, in the case’s last opinion, explained why the 
Court should act on that interest.168 
F.  Justice Scalia’s Concurrence in Part and Dissent in Part 
Justice Scalia agreed only with the majority’s handling of the 
two jurisdictional issues.169 He emphatically disagreed with its 
handling of the substantive question.170 In his view, the Court 
deferred to an “unnatural” regulatory interpretation “simply because 
[the] EPA says that it believes the unnatural reading is right.”171 
When it came to Seminole Rock deference, Justice Scalia reasoned, 
“Enough is enough.”172 
Justice Scalia began from the proposition that Seminole Rock 
deference is really the same blanket deference afforded by Chevron, 
but applied to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous regulations 
rather than of statutes.173 Were it anything less, the standard would 
be of no use, since any interpretation “different from the fairest 
 
 163. See id. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1339. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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reading . . . is in that sense ‘inconsistent’ with the regulation.”174 
Absent blanket deference, the standard would compel deference only 
when the court adjudged the agency’s interpretation to be the 
“fairest”—that is, only when the court agreed with the agency. 
From there, Justice Scalia discussed the prevailing rationales for 
the standard and concluded that none could justify the violation of 
separation of powers principles.175 Addressing the merits, he found 
that permits were required.176 
1.  Existing Rationales and the Separation of Powers 
In Justice Scalia’s view, there is no “persuasive” rationale for 
Seminole Rock deference.177 He dismissed the originalist rationale 
because courts do not consider the agency’s intent when interpreting 
a regulation, but the regulation’s plain language.178 He dismissed the 
“agency expertise” rationale as confusing the role of administrative 
agencies with that of the courts: agencies make rules, and courts 
interpret them.179 In his view, an agency’s expertise explains why it 
should regulate and decide policy but not why it should have 
authority to interpret the regulations it makes.180 To the contrary, the 
“agency expertise” rationale ignores the most basic separation of 
powers principle: an entity with the power to make law should not 
also have the authority to interpret and enforce it.181 
Justice Scalia, therefore, directly refuted the theory of implied 
delegation in the context of agency interpretations of regulations. In 
his view, though the theory explains why deference is due in the 
Chevron context, “there is surely no congressional implication that 
[an] agency can resolve ambiguities in its own regulations.”182 
Violating that principle creates the potential for abuse. For 
example, agencies may endeavor to maintain flexibility by issuing 
vague regulations that they may conveniently interpret when a 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 1341. 
 176. Id. at 1342. 
 177. Id. at 1339. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 1341. 
 182. Id. 
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dispute arises.183 Viewed in this light, Seminole Rock deference “is 
not a logical corollary to Chevron but a dangerous permission slip 
for the arrogation of power.”184 
Finally, Justice Scalia distinguished Seminole Rock from 
Chevron by noting that administrative agencies may amend 
regulations if a reviewing court disagrees with their 
interpretations.185 The EPA, for example, amended the Industrial 
Activity Rule after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling but before the Supreme 
Court even heard arguments.186 Similarly, the EPA amended the 
Silvicultural Rule after the D.C. District Court’s 1975 ruling but 
before the D.C. Circuit’s 1977 ruling.187 These relatively quick 
turnarounds undermine the “pragmatic” benefit afforded by Seminole 
Rock’s blanket deference—namely, an expedient method of 
obtaining a clear articulation of a regulation’s meaning.188 
2.  The Merits 
Accordingly, Justice Scalia would have held that permits were 
required.189 Put simply, because a “series of pipes, ditches, and 
channels” conveyed the runoff from the logging roads into the two 
Oregon rivers,190 Justice Scalia reasoned that the discharges came 
from a point source.191 He rejected the EPA’s argument that, under 
the Silvicultural Rule, the discharges did not come from a point 
source because they were composed of “natural runoff.”192 In his 
view, “manmade pipes and ditches” conveyed the “manmade 
pollutants” from “manmade forest roads” to the rivers.193 
Consequently, the runoff was not “natural.”194 
In addition, Justice Scalia concluded that the discharges were 
“associated with industrial activity” and thus, under the Industrial 
 
 183. Id.; see also supra Part II.B.2. 
 184. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 185. Id. at 1341–42. 
 186. Id. at 1342. 
 187. See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text. 
 188. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 192. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 1343 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Activity Rule, not exempt from the Act’s permitting scheme.195 
Unlike the majority, he read the Industrial Activity Rule to include 
logging as one of the industries considered to be engaging in 
industrial activity.196 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Although the Seminole Rock Court first articulated the standard, 
it did not immediately defer to the Price Administrator’s 
interpretation of the price freeze requirement. Instead, it used the 
interpretation to supplement its own construction of the regulation. 
The Court appeared to independently conclude that the regulation 
attached to transactions in which goods were actually delivered in the 
month of March 1942. Only then did it turn to the agency’s 
interpretation. 
The same cannot be said of the Court in Auer. There, the Court 
limited its discussion of the agency interpretation to two dictionary 
definitions of a single phrase. This is not enough. The Court’s 
approach in Seminole Rock was the better one: courts should 
interpret regulations for themselves.197 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Decker explains why. Throughout his 
opinion, Justice Scalia advocates upholding the “fairest” reading of 
any given regulation. In his words, the judicial role “to say what the 
law is”198 equates “to determin[ing] the fair meaning of the rule.”199 
Similarly, in his words, interpreting a regulation equates to 
determining whether “what the petitioners did . . . [was] proscribed 
by the fairest reading of the regulations.”200 
If the goal is to determine the “fairest” reading of a regulation, 
the question then becomes how the system should ensure that result. 
The word “fair,” by definition, requires an impartial party capable of 
resolving a dispute.201 Administrative agencies could be such parties. 
Just because an agency has an interest in the future of a regulatory 
 
 195. Id. at 1343–44. 
 196. Id. at 1343. 
 197. See Anthony, supra note 41, at 11 (“The court’s job should be to interpret the regulation, 
not merely to decide whether the agency interpretation should be accepted or rejected.”). 
 198. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 199. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1340 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 200. Id. at 1342. 
 201. See Fair Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam 
-webster.com/dictionary/fair (last visited Nov. 2013). 
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order does not imply that its interpretation becomes compromised 
when challenged and under judicial review.202 Similarly, just because 
a court reviewing an agency interpretation seeks to find the fairest 
reading does not imply that what it deems fair will differ from the 
agency’s interpretation. 
The principle of separation of powers, however, contemplates 
that administrative agencies will not be impartial, dispute-resolving 
parties, even if they could be. The principle not only separates the 
three branches of the federal government but also installs checks and 
balances between them.203 In this way, the principle shapes the 
structure of the entire system.204 It therefore accounts for the 
possibility that an agency interpreting its own regulation may not 
provide the fairest reading. 
Thus, as a general matter, the principle of separation of powers 
ensures procedural fairness. No matter the result in a given case, the 
parties will likely dispute the “fairness” of the outcome. That is the 
nature of the adversarial system. Therefore, regardless of whether a 
court’s interpretation brings about a fair result, which will always be 
open to debate, the fact that a court interprets the regulation in the 
course of deciding the dispute protects “against a gradual 
concentration of the several powers in the same department.”205 
The separation of powers concern, therefore, distinguishes 
Seminole Rock from Chevron. When an agency interprets a statute, it 
acts as “one independent interpretive check on lawmaking by 
Congress.”206 The check on lawmaking by agencies does not exist 
when courts defer to agency interpretations.207 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The blanket deference afforded by Seminole Rock has come to 
mean that courts no longer need to interpret regulations for 
 
 202. But see Anthony, supra note 41, at 9–10 (“The positions that agencies assert in their 
interpretations of regulations often are institutionally self-interested and are intended to impose 
adverse effects upon private persons.”). 
 203. Matthew James Tanielian, Comment, Separation of Powers and the Supreme Court: One 
Doctrine, Two Visions, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 961, 965–66 (1995). 
 204. Id. at 966. 
 205. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 206. Manning, supra note 17, at 639. 
 207. Id. 
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themselves. The result is an approach where courts abdicate the 
judicial role in contravention of Marbury v. Madison and the APA. 
It is time for the Court to revisit Seminole Rock. In the words of 
Justice Scalia, “It is time for us to presume . . . that an agency says in 
a rule what it means, and means in a rule what it says there.”208 The 
opinions of Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts in Decker 
indicate that three members of the Court are open to reexamining the 
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